Introduction
While the "Cold War" nuclear threat may be over, litigation in the arena of nuclear-related incidents is heating up. Surprisingly, Native Americans may find themselves intimately involved in this litigation in the near future. This is because much of Native American lands contain facilities that mine and produce uranium for the United States' nuclear energy programs.
In the wake of these uranium production facilities are five thousand Native American employees' and thousands of other Indian families that live dangerously close to the facilities. 2 William Rowe, former Deputy Assistant Administrator for Radiation Programs of the Environmental Protection Agency, testified in congressional hearings that radon gas is so highly carcinogenic that radioactive levels at uranium mill sites would approximately double the lung cancer rate for nearby residents.' While it may take many years for unsuspecting Native Americans and their families to recognize they have been injured, it is only a matter of time before some seek compensation for their injuries in court.
But which court do Native Americans turn to for help? Tribal court? State court? Federal court? One would suspect Indians could go to their own reservation tribal court to seek recompense for their injuries. Under the tribal court exhaustion doctrine, the tribal court should have jurisdiction over the action because the injury occurred to an Indian on reservation land The only 
JURISDICTION IN NUCLEAR INCIDENTS History of the Price-Anderson Act
Congress initiated regulation of the nuclear power industry with the enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. While that statute reflected Congress' determination that the nuclear power industry would be a government monopoly, Congress later concluded that it would be in the national interest to permit private sector involvement in the industry under a system of federal licensing and regulation. This policy decision was implemented in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.' However, the private actors entering the nuclear power industry were still required to confront the risks associated with potentially devastating liability which might be imposed in the event of a major nuclear accident. " [W] hile repeatedly stressing that the risk of a major nuclear accident was extremely remote, spokesmen for the private sector informed Congress that they would be forced to withdraw from the field if their liability were not limited by appropriate legislation." development of the atomic energy industry."' The Act contained three central elements. First, the Act set a ceiling on the aggregate liability that could be imposed upon those engaged in the use and handling of radioactive material "either through contract with the Federal Government or under a license issued by the Federal Government for the private development of such activities."'" The second important feature of the Act involved the "channeling of liability." Under this provision, any entity exposed to potential liability for activity resulting in a nuclear incident, 3 even if it was not a direct participant in the activity, was entitled to indemnification. Finally, the Price-Anderson Act established that all public liability claims above the amount of required public insurance protection "would be indemnified by the Federal Government, up to the aggregate amount on liability.' 4 In 1966, prior to the scheduled expiration of the Price-Anderson Act, the liability limitation portions of the Act were extended for an additional ten years 8. Id. § § 2211 Id. § § -2281 . Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 64 (1978) . 10. 42 U.S.C . § 2210 (1994) . 11. Id. § 2012(i) . 12. S. REP. No. 100-218 (1988) , reprinted in 1988 U.S.C. C.A.N. 1476, 1477. 13 . A nuclear incident is defined as any occurrence... within the United States causing, within or outside the United States, bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage to property, or loss of use of property, arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material .... 42 U.S.C. § 2014(q) (1994) .
14. S. REP. No. 100-218, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1477 and a new provision was added which required that those indemnified waive the defenses of negligence, contributory negligence, charitable or governmental immunity, and assumption of risk in the event of an action arising from the result of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence. 15 The 1966 amendments also provided for the transfer of all claims arising out of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence to a federal district court.
1 6 These provisions grew out of congressional concern that state tort law dealing with liability for nuclear incidents was generally unsettled and some way of ensuring a common standard of responsibility for all jurisdictions was needed.'
7
In 1975, Congress amended the Price-Anderson Act a second time. These amendments extended the Act's coverage and made certain liability limitation adjustments. Provision was also made to phase out the federal indemnity portion of the Price-Anderson scheme.
In 1988, Congress amended the Price-Anderson Act for a third time, enacting the Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988. The decision to amend and extend the Price-Anderson Act grew out of the congressional conclusion that:
The Price Anderson system, including the waiver of defenses provisions, the omnibus coverage, and the predetermined sources of funding, provides persons seeking compensation for injuries as a result of a nuclear incident with significant advantages over the procedures and standards for recovery that might otherwise be applicable under State tort law. The Act also provides a mechanism whereby the federal government can continue to encourage private sector participation in the beneficial uses of nuclear materials."
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The Amendments Act included an expansion of the reach of section 2210(n)(2) to provide for removal of, and original federal jurisdiction over, claims arising from any "nuclear incident."' 9 Section 2210(n)(2) was amended to read as follows:
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1) (1994) . An extraordinary nuclear occurrence is defined as any event causing a discharge or dispersal of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material from its intended place of confinement in amounts offsite, or causing radiation levels offsite, which the . . . Commission . . . determines to be substantial, and which the... Commission ... determines has resulted or will probably result in substantial damages to persons offsite or property offsite.
Id. § 2014(j).
16. Id. § 2210(n)(2). 17. A waiver of defenses approach was thought to be preferable since it entailed less interference with state tort law than would the enactment of a federal statute prescribing strict liability. See S. REP. No. 89-1605 (1966 It is the language and the legislative history of this section which generates the questions concerning tribal court jurisdiction over Price-Anderson claims.
Public Liability
Section 2014(hh) of the Price-Anderson Act defines a public liability action as "any suit asserting public liability.'
'1 Under the terms of the 1988 Amendments Act, the "public liability action" encompasses "any legal liability" of any person who may be liable because of a nuclear incident.' Given the breadth of this definition, the consequences of a determination that a particular plaintiff has failed to state a public liability claim potentially compensable under the Price-Anderson Act is that he has no claim at all.
After the Amendments Act, no state cause of action based upon public liability exists. A claim growing out of any nuclear incident is compensable under the terms of the Amendments Act or it is not compensable at all. Any conceivable state tort action which might remain available to a plaintiff following the determination that his claim could not qualify as a public liability action, would not be based on 'any legal liability' of 'any person who may be liable on account of a nuclear incident.' It would be some other species of tort altogether, and the fact that the state courts might recognize such a tort has no relevance to the Price-Anderson scheme z 20. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (1994). 21. Id. § 2014(hh) . Public liability is a concept which was not changed by the 1988 Amendments Act. Public liability was defined in the original Price-Anderson Act as "any legal liability arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident or precautionary evacuation .... " Id. § 2014(w The issue as to whether a Native American tribal court has jurisdiction to adjudicate a lawsuit involving injuries to Indians arising from a nuclear incident that takes place on Indian territory has been overlooked since the PriceAnderson Act was enacted in 1957. This is a major oversight considering the highest concentration of uranium mining and milling activity occurs on Indian reservations in the San Juan River Basin of northern New Mexico and southern Colorado' Potential claims of uranium contamination and subsequent cancer are just now beginning to surface in Native American families.' Each of 24. Congress recognized that Article III of the Constitution limited the types of cases that federal courts created under the Article may hear. For this reason, House Bill 1414 expressly states that any suit asserting public liability shall be deemed to be an action under the PriceAnderson Act, thereby making suits asserting public liability "[c]ases... arising under ... the laws of the United States" within the meaning of Article Ill. Rather than design a new body of substantive rules for decision in nuclear incident actions, the bill provides the substantive rules for decision shall be derived from the law of the state in which the nuclear incident occurs unless such law is inconsistent with the Price-Anderson Act. H.R. REP. NO. 100-104, pt. 1, at 18 (1987) . The constitutionality aspect of the Price-Anderson Act is beyond the scope of this article.
25. Almost half of the area within the basin, the Grants Mineral Belt, lies on lands belonging to the Navajo Nation, Laguna Pueblo, Acoma Pueblo, and Canoncito Pueblo. Uranium production on Indian lands in the Grants Mineral Belt and elsewhere in New Mexico account for nearly fifty percent cf the total uranium oxide mined in the United States since 1977. The leased Navajo Nation land account for fifteen percent of the mineral belt contributions and the bulk of the uranium oxide production. 32 The school and its insurer subsequently filed an action in federal court, seeking an injunction against the tribal member pursuing the claim, arguing that the Crow Tribal Court had no jurisdiction over non-Indians. 33 The Supreme Court held that the federal court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the school district's motion for injunction because the issue as to whether or not the tribal court had jurisdiction over non-Indians was a federal question.' M Nevertheless, the Court held the federal court should not hear the case because to do so would be an impermissible infringement upon the sovereignty of the Crow Tribe.
35 Specifically, the Court stated:
Our cases have often recognized that Congress is committed to a policy of supporting tribal self-government and self-determination. That policy favors a rule that will provide the forum whose jurisdiction is being challenged the first opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal bases for the challenge. Moreover the orderly administration of justice in the federal court will be served by In 1985, the Navajo Tribal Council amended the Navajo Tribal Code (with Resolution CJY-57-85) to clarify the definition of territorial jurisdiction. This was done in order to bring the definition of "Navajo Indian country" in line with the federal definition of "Indian Country" found in case law interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1151. Navajo Indian country is defined as: All land within the exterior boundaries of the Navajo Indian Reservation or of the Eastern Navajo Agency, all land within the limits of dependent Navajo Indian communities, all Navajo allotments, and all other land held in trust for, owned in fee by, or leased by the United States to the Navajo Tribe or any Band of Navajo Indians. NAvAJO NATION CODE tit. 7, § 254 (Equity 1986 Similarly, in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the tribal court exhaustion requirement announced in National Farmers, a federal question case, also applied to cases in which federal court jurisdiction was predicated on diversity of citizenship. The Supreme Court held the tribal court exhaustion doctrine applied to diversity of citizenship cases because '[t]he diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, makes no reference to Indians and nothing in the legislative history suggests any intent to render inoperative the established federal policy promoting tribal self-government." 9 The Court emphasized that "[t]tribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty. ... 'Because the Tribe retains all inherent attributes of sovereignty that have not been divested by the Federal Government, the proper inference from silence ... is that the sovereign power ... remains intact.""eI Thus, because nothing in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 demonstrated an intent by Congress to limit tribal jurisdiction, "the federal policy supporting tribal self-government directs a federal court to stay its hand in order to give the tribal court a 'full opportunity to determine its own jurisdictionY. When the activity at issue arises on the reservation, these policies [to promote tribal self-determination] almost always dictate that the parties exhaust their tribal remedies before resorting to the federal forum. Thus, we have characterized the tribal exhaustion rule as 'an inflexible bar to consideration of the merits of the petition by On the basis of courts' views of the tribal court exhaustion doctrine, one can assert the only way a tribal court could lose its jurisdiction for injuries to Indians occurring in Indian country is by Congress expressly stating there is no tribal court jurisdiction. This is where the Price-Anderson Act fits in. The Price-Anderson Act arguably preempts the field of nuclear-related injuries.f Thus the questions become: (1) whether the Price-Anderson Act provides an express prohibition to tribal court jurisdiction; and (2) whether tribal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Price-Anderson claims.
Tribal Court Jurisdictional Prohibition
Principles of Native American sovereignty always begin with the tribal court maintaining jurisdiction over claims which occur in their country. While the Price-Anderson Act may determine who can exercise regulatory control over nuclear licensees, the Act does not determine whether a tribal court is capable of adjudicating a nuclear incident. A tribal court, just as much as a state court, has the ability to apply federal law to reach a decision. The Supreme Court in Iowa Mutual emphatically rejected the argument that tribal courts are somehow biased or not competent enough to render just decisions." Similarly, in Tsosie, the district court in the San Juan River Basin jurisdiction stated that "a tribal court, presumably, is as competent to interpret federal law as it is state law."
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Cases concerning Price-Anderson speak in terms of the federal government's preemptory right to regulate the nuclear industry.' None of the cases discuss preemptory rights for jurisdictional matters. For example, in In re Three Mile Island Litigation Cases Consolidated H (TMI II),"' the court held as a result of Price-Anderson, "states are precluded from regulating the safety aspects of nuclear energy," ' and the federal government has "exclusive regulatory authority." ' 53 The court went on to hold that although damage actions under Price-Anderson are governed by state law, state standards of liability were nevertheless void if they "frustrate[d] the objectives of the federal law."' The petition to be dismissed when it appears there has been a failure to exhaust all tribal remedies).
44 In other words, "states are preempted from imposing a non-federal duty in tort, because any state duty would infringe upon pervasive federal regulation in the ,field of nuclear safety, and. thus would conflict with federal law." ' 56 These are choice of law issues which have no bearing on the issue of which courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate causes of action arising under PriceAnderson. The Act may preempt the field of nuclear energy and may create a "new and independent, indeed exclusive, cause of action," but preemption, in the context of Price-Anderson, only means the tribal court adjudicating the case must apply federal law.
Concurrent Jurisdiction
Tribal self-government advocates also contend Price-Anderson does not create exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts. When Congress intends to provide for an exclusively federal forum, it knows how to say so. S. 190, 204 (1983) 
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Congress intended for federal courts to be the exclusive forum for adjudicating actions under the Act.
The Act expressly acknowledges state courts may adjudicate Price-Anderson cases. The fact such cases are subject to removal does not eliminate the existence of concurrent state jurisdiction. Moreover, the fact that section 2210 (n)(2) speaks only in terms of state courts cannot be read to mean only state courts, and not tribal courts, have concurrent jurisdiction. Tribal courts are presumed to have jurisdiction over matters arising on reservation lands, unless Congress expressly and affirmatively takes such jurisdiction away." Because the terms of section 2210 (n)(2) of Price-Anderson provide for concurrent state jurisdiction, tribal courts should be read to have concurrent jurisdiction as well. If Congress intended anything to the contrary, it would have expressly stated so in the Act itself.
Civil tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians on Indian lands is presumed unless Congress expressly takes it away. Neither the text nor the legislative history of the Price-Anderson Act specifically address how the Act would affect Indian tribes or tribal courts. The contention that tribal courts have no jurisdiction because the Price-Anderson Act does not specifically delegate such jurisdiction to tribal courts misapplies the rule in Iowa Mutual.
Congress does not have to delegate jurisdictional authority to tribal courts. In fact, the opposite is true. The Supreme Court made this clear in Iowa Mutual when it stated: "Tribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty. Civil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute."
6 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit stated with respect to non-Indians on reservation lands, that "[j]urisdiction presumptively lies in the tribal court, therefore, unless Congress has expressly limited that jurisdiction." ' 63 The only exceptions to the tribal court exhaustion doctrine can be found in footnote 21 in the National Farmers case.' In National Farmers, the Supreme Court stated it did "not suggest that exhaustion would be required . .. where the action is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions";' however, the Court insisted in the later opinion of Iowa Mutual that the jurisdictional prohibition be express." Thus, when a federal statute fails to address issues pertaining to tribal court jurisdiction, "the proper inference from [congressional] 
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The removal provisions of the Price-Anderson Act does not guarantee a right to a federal forum.' To the extent there is any guarantee, it is only that a defendant in state court may remove the case to federal court. Nothing in section 2210(n)(2) authorizes, much less guarantees, that actions in tribal court may also be removed to federal court.
The Federal Circuit Court in the San Juan River Basin held actions in tribal courts cannot be removed. In Becenti v. Vigil, ' the issue was whether 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), which authorizes removal of cases involving actions against officers of the United States, applied to actions initially filed in tribal court." The Tenth Circuit held tribal court actions could not be removed because 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (a)(1) did not expressly authorize removal of tribal court actions.
7 ' The United States contended the purpose of the removal statute was to ensure that "a Federal officer or agent shall not be forced to answer for conduct assertedly within his duties in any but a Federal forum." ' In rejecting the federal forum argument, the Tenth Circuit held "[t]he question before us, however, is not whether Congress has the power to authorize removal of actions commenced in tribal courts ... but rather whether Congress has in fact done so. We must be careful not to expand the jurisdiction of federal courts beyond Congressional mandates." ' 73 Hence, the fact 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) did not expressly authorize removal from tribal court was dispositive.
The reasoning of Becenti also applies to the Price-Anderson Act. If Congress desired to guarantee a federal forum for all Price-Anderson-related incidents, including those cases filed in tribal court, Congress would have stated so expressly. It did not. Had Congress desired to confer exclusive federal jurisdiction over Price-Anderson incidents, Congress would have said so expressly. It did not. Accordingly, the Price-Anderson Act does not guarantee a federal forum.
Summary
From the Native American sovereignty perspective, the Price-Anderson Act does not contain an express prohibition of tribal court jurisdiction nor compel 
Price-Anderson Perspective
The foregoing Native American sovereignty views of jurisdictional issues in the case law context of the Price-Anderson Act could lead one to argue there can be no "express jurisdictional prohibition" under National Farmers and Iowa Mutual unless exclusive federal jurisdiction is explicitly reserved within the text of the statute at issue. 74 Predictably however, the law is not so crisp. Instead, courts have recognized a jurisdictional prohibition may be made "express" through (1) legislative history, (2) interpretive case law, or (3) contextual interpretation of the statute itself. The jurisdictional prohibition contained within 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) of Price-Anderson can be independently demonstrated through each of these means. The resulting conclusion from these interpretations is that tribal courts may not have jurisdiction over nuclear incidents that occur on their territory under the Price-Anderson Act.
Legislative History
The United States Supreme Court relied on legislative history to determine whether there were jurisdictional prohibitions in the very cases that established the tribal court exhaustion doctrine. In Iowa Mutual, the Supreme Court held tribal courts had jurisdiction over diversity cases based upon the legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 1332:
The diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, makes no reference to Indians and nothing in the legislative history suggests any intent to render inoperative the established federal policy promoting tribal self-government. Tribal courts in the Anglo-American mold were virtually unknown in 1789 when Congress first authorized diversity jurisdiction, see Judiciary Act of 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 78-79; and the original statute did not manifest a congressional intent to limit tribal sovereignty." Similarly, in National Farmers, the Supreme Court inferred a legislative intent to allow tribal courts federal question jurisdiction over non-Indians by comparing the absence of federal legislation governing such civil suits with preemptive legislation that gives federal courts jurisdiction over non-Indians charged with crimes in Indian country. 7 6 Although there are federal statutes punishing crimes by non-Indians on the reservation, the court noted that "there 74 
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is no comparable legislation granting the federal courts jurisdiction over civil disputes between Indians and non-Indians that arise on an Indian reservation." ' Accordingly, the Court found a lack of a congressional intent to create the same exclusive federal jurisdiction over non-Indians in civil cases as it had for reservation criminal cases through the Major Crimes Act."
Uniformly, the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) demonstrates a clear congressional intent that any defendant, or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission itself, has an absolute right to have Price-Anderson case in federal court has been true from the beginning of Price-Anderson. When section 2210(n)(2) was first enacted in 1966, Price-Anderson covered only Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrences (ENOs); then the statute was written so all claims arising from the same ENO could be consolidated before a single federal court.
New Section 170(n)(2) [42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2)] establishes the applicable venue and jurisdiction for public liability actions arising out of or resulting from an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence."
An action may be instituted in a State court or another U.S. district court, and, indeed, may be permitted to continue in such court if the circumstances of the occurrence and the action do not appear to the defendant or the Commission to necessitate removal.
However, the absolute right of removal or transfer by the defendant or the Commission to the U.S. district court having venue under subsection 170(n)(2) [42 U.S.C. § 2210 (n)(2)] would be assured.'s
The consequences of limiting Price-Anderson claims to ENOs became apparent when over three thousand claims arising from the Three Mile Island accident were filed in different state and federal courts.
The Three Mile Island nuclear accidente 1 was the primary impetus for the 1988 revisions of section 2210(n)(2) of the Price-Anderson Act. Over three thousand claims were filed as a result of the Three Mile Island incident, however bqcause of the 1966 ENO limitation in section 2210(n)(2), the Third .77. Id. 78. Id. at 854-55. The Major Crimes Act provides that Indians committing any of the enumerated offenses "shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994 The Price-Anderson Act had worked well, with the exception of this jurisdictional issue. The problem that arose from varying jurisdictions handling a nonserious nuclear accident, like TMI, was that it could spawn thousands of claims in hundreds of different jurisdictions. Consequently, the cost to determine the appropriate level of compensation in each jurisdiction becomes extraordinarily high. This would be true unless some means was provided to consolidate the litigation in one federal court. David Berger, an attorney for multiple TMI I1 plaintiffs, addressed the need for consolidation in terms of judicial economy: "[W]e should have a minimizing of transactional costs. Instead of having thousand of cases brought all over the fifty states and six territories ... there would be one court, one case to resolve the matter."" 7 In the Nuclear Regulation Hearing itself, specific questions regarding compensation for claimants and federal jurisdiction were asked by the presiding senators. The responses to these questions are persuasive in demonstrating that 82. 746 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1984 82. 746 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. ), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 82. 746 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. (1985 Mr. Harkins: Yes, absolutely, Senator, I believe that is highly necessary. We had it until the Third Circuit ruled there wasn't Federal question jurisdiction [in Stibitz]. We had it and we had the efficiencies that go with it. I think that we should get it back legislatively.
Senator Mitchell: It would be better for the defendants as well as the plaintiffs wouldn't it?
Mr. Harkins: For both sides, absolutely. It makes all of the advantages for the system, and it doesn't give any unusual advantage to either party.
Mr. Kennedy (of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission): I would subscribe to what Mr. Harkins has said. We, long ago concluded in other connections that in the mass case, the right solution is exclusive Federal jurisdiction in a single Federal court.
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Additional support for consolidation of nuclear claims in a single federal court can be found from statements by Senator McClure, the ranking minority member in the State Energy Committee at the time, who read a statement by one of the witnesses of the same Nuclear Regulation Hearing into the Congressional Record during debates on the Price-Anderson Amendments Act. 88 . Id. at 13-14 (emphasis added). 89. Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added).
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https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol21/iss1/4 Kenneth Feinberg, an attorney for multiple plaintiffs in asbestos litigation and former staff member of the Judiciary Committee, stated:
To avoid confusion, inconsistency, and duplicative litigation in large-scale accidents, the [Price-Anderson] Act requires that all victims' claims be consolidated and tried in a single federal court. This sharply contrasts with the experience in the asbestos litigations, in which tens of thousands of lawsuits have been scattered throughout the state and federal courts across the United States. As a consequence, the asbestos litigations have defied coherent resolution, and have fostered unfair and disparate judgments and settlements at great expense to all parties, and only after considerable delay. In addition to conserving funds for victims that would otherwise go to legal fees, consolidated claims in one court helps assure that victims with similar injuries are treated alike°S enate Bill 1865 comprised the recommended 1988 amendments to the Price-Anderson Act.
9
' After hearing recommendations in the Nuclear Regulation Hearing, the Environment and Public Works Committee wrote Senate Report 218, recommending that Senate Bill 1865 be passed and setting forth its recommendations. These recommendations and much of the Senate bills' text were then incorporated into House Bill 1414.' This bill was subsequently passed by both houses of the Congress and signed into law by the President 3 There was no conference report generated. Senate Report 218 specifically discusses: (1) the problem created by Stibitz as addressed in the Nuclear Regulation Hearing; (2) the testimony of the attorneys representing both plaintiffs and defendants in the TMI litigation from the Nuclear Regulation Hearing; and (3) the need to make it possible to consolidate all claims arising out of any nuclear incident in a single federal district court as discussed in the Nuclear Regulation Hearing.
While Committee hearings are technically not part of a legislative history because they do not contain congressional deliberations, the adaptation of language from those hearings into the Senate Report is persuasive as to why Accordingly, the bill provides the federal district court in which the nuclear incident occurred [with] subject matter jurisdiction over claims arising from the nuclear incident. Any suit asserting public liability shall be deemed to be an action arising under the PriceAnderson Act, and the substantive law of decision shall be derived from the law of the State in which the incident occurred, in order to satisfy the Article III requirement that federal courts have jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution or under the laws of the United States. 4 Based on the language within the Senate Report, which appears to be adopted directly from the Nuclear Regulation Hearing, the 1988 amendments to the Price-Anderson Act are designed to prevent multiple, separate, nuclear tort claims from taking place in various tribal and state courts by uranium mill workers, neighbors, and members of families -regardless of whether the tort was committed on Indian country or not.
The legislative history of the 1988 Price-Anderson Amendments Act demonstrates a congressional intent that every defendant facing liability under the Act has an absolute right to have its case heard in federal court. Everything from congressional hearings to congressional floor debate to Senate Reports 94. S. REP. No. 100-218, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1488 state the Amendments Act was to provide an exclusive federal forum for PriceAnderson defendants. Providing tribal courts with concurrent jurisdiction over nuclear incidents would defeat this congressional purpose.
Case Law
Express tribal court jurisdictional prohibitions are also created by case law. In United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe" and United States v. Yakima Tribal Court," the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found tribal court exhaustion was unnecessary to enjoin tribal court actions brought against government officials because tribal court jurisdiction was precluded by the judicially recognized doctrine of sovereign immunity.'
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe 8 is even more instructive when considering jurisdictional prohibitions. In Oliphant, the Supreme Court "concluded that federal legislation conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts to try non-Indians for offenses committed in Indian Country had implicitly preempted tribal jurisdiction."' The important point taken from Oliphant is there is no "express" statutory jurisdictional prohibition which precludes non-Indians from being tried for crimes in tribal court. Yet by finding an implicit federal preemption and making it explicit through its decision in Oliphant, the United States Supreme Court created an "express jurisdictional prohibition." No one can doubt if, in disregard of Oliphant, a non-Indian were criminally charged in tribal court today, he would be entitled to have his prosecution enjoined by a federal court without the necessity of tribal exhaustion."°A nd so it is with the Price-Anderson Act. In Oliphant, the Supreme Court announced a rule. of law based upon its judicial determination that Congress intended to take away criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians from Indian tribes. Similarly, TMI 11 and O'Connor v. Commonwealth Edison Co.' have judicially announced that section 2210(n)(2) of Price-Anderson must be interpreted so all cases from a nuclear incident can be consolidated before a single federal district court. Consequently, like Oliphant, the courts have created an "express federal preemption" against hearing Price-Anderson claims in tribal court. 95. 784 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1986 ). 96. 806 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1986 ), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987 
Statutory Interpretation
The Native American sovereignty perspective which holds all express jurisdictional prohibitions must say federal jurisdiction is "exclusive" or "tribal court jurisdiction is precluded" within the statute itself is an unreasonable interpretation of statutory construction in the jurisdictional area of the law. As we have already seen in Oliphant, the law is not so uniformly literal.
For example, in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a), which governs jurisdiction of lawsuits brought against the United States, the statute says "district courts shall have original jurisdiction" and also acknowledges the existence of "concurrent [jurisdiction] with the United States Court of Federal Claims."'" The language is equivalent to that found in section 2210(n)(2) of the PriceAnderson Act. ' With respect to concurrent jurisdiction, the Price-Anderson Act is confined to state courts with an absolute right of removal."° For section 1346(a) concurrent jurisdiction is vested in the United States Court of Federal Claims. Even though 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a), like section 2210(n)(2) of Price-Anderson, does not explicitly restrict jurisdiction to federal district courts and federal court of claims, it has been universally interpreted as excluding jurisdiction by other courts."' Moreover, courts generally recognize when a statute commits review of a specific class of claims to a certain court, like the federal district court in Price-Anderson, the jurisdiction of that court over the claims is public and ... encourage the development of the atomic energy industry.11aI Furthermore, the "Price-Anderson System" is a package which includes omnibus coverage and provisions to simplify litigation, and "also provides a mechanism whereby the federal government can continue to encourage private sector participation in the beneficial uses of nuclear materials."' ' 3 The ability to simplify and limit the transaction costs of litigation through the 1988 Amendments to section 2210 of the Price-Anderson Act is a vital part of this "System": "Thus, the [1988] Amendments Act is the latest installment in nearly fifty years of congressional work. During that time, Congress has attempted to encourage the development of domestic nuclear power to the fullest extent through licensing, indemnification, limitation of liability, and consolidation of litigation."'' As demonstrated by the legislative history of the 1988 Amendments, reducing the cost of nuclear incident litigation by providing for consolidation in a single federal district court is an essential part of the atomic energy regulatory function achieved through Price-Anderson's federal preemption. Statutory interpretation of the Price-Anderson Act leads to the conclusion that tribal court jurisdiction was designed to be preempted by the Act.
Sumnnary
The 1988 Price-Anderson Amendments were enacted to serve the interests of judicial economy. Consequently, actions growing from operations of uranium mills in Indian country are compelled to federal courts. No purpose is served by forcing plaintiffs or defendants of nuclear incidents to exhaust their jurisdictional arguments in a multitude of different tribal courts. As a result of complete federal preemption in the area of nuclear safety, there is an express jurisdictional prohibition against Price-Anderson actions in any court but the United States federal district court for the district in which the event occurred or in state court with an absolute right of removal and transfer to that federal venue.
Future Implications
Who has jurisdiction in nuclear incidents that take place in Indian country? The simple answer, when one only looks at a few courts holdings, is that the tribal court maintains jurisdiction. Both the National Farmers and Iowa Mutual decisions appear to support the conclusion that tribal courts are'presumed to have jurisdiction for injuries to Indians occurring on Indian reservations. Moreover, the language of Price-Anderson does not explicitly assert a jurisdictional prohibition against tribal courts, nor does the Act assert tribal 129. O'Connor, 13 F.3d at 1095 (quoting 42 U.S.C . § 2012 (1994) [Vol. 21
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol21/iss1/4 courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction over nuclear-related actions. From a cursory analysis, courts and attorneys would probably claim Price-Anderson does not preempt tribal jurisdiction. However, one cannot ignore all of the subtleties of the tribal exhaustion cases and the Price-Anderson Act.
Once the tribal court exhaustion doctrine and the Price-Anderson Act are looked at in their entirety, the congressional desire to recognize tribal courts jurisdiction under all but express circumstances becomes extremely unclear. Each of the tribal court exhaustion cases have left themselves open to interpretation. There are subtle inferences contained within the exhaustion doctrine opinions which could lead the legal community to believe "express" language within a statute is not necessary to overcome tribal exhaustion if the congressional intent to prohibit such jurisdiction is clear from the legislative history of the statute. The legislative intent of the Amendments to the PriceAnderson Act and historical statutory interpretation of similar statutes make it appear Congress is not always as "express" in its prohibition against tribal courts jurisdiction as judges and attorneys would like.
The Federal Government has the ability to take away tribal court jurisdiction over Price-Anderson claims if it desires to do so. The legislative history, case law and statutory interpretation of the Price-Anderson Act may point to such a motive, but the language to preclude tribal jurisdiction is far from crystal clear. Consequently, to take away the tribal court's ability to be the first to determine if it wants jurisdiction over nuclear-related incidents taking place on its territory would be patently violative of the tribal court exhaustion doctrine which requires an express statement by Congress to preclude such jurisdiction."' Moreover, courts have consistently held tribal sovereign powers remain intact when a federal statute, like Price-Anderson, fails to address issues pertaining to tribal court jurisdiction. ' It is important to note, however, that tribal court exhaustion does not mean the tribal court will or should accept jurisdiction over Price-Anderson claims. The legislative history of the 1988 amendments to Price-Anderson and prior case law affirmatively state Congress' desire to consolidate all nuclear-related incidents in a single forum to avoid confusion, inconsistency, and the duplicative litigation experienced in the TMI litigation." Thus, if a tribal court does decide to accept jurisdiction over a Price-Anderson claim it is arguably assuming the responsibility to adjudicate all claims arising from the respective nuclear incident irrespective of where those claimants come 
